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This article is centred around the notions of shareholder value orientation and financialisation. 
Shareholder value orientation is reflected by a high dividend payout ratio applied by firms and 
the reluctance of firms to finance physical investment via new equity issues. Financialisation 
is the more general development towards an increased importance of the financial sector of 
the economy relative to the non-financial sector. In this article, a synthetic, stock flow consis-
tent model is developed that attempts to encompass and at times adjust some important recent 
works on the effects of financialisation. This includes contributions from the fields of main-
stream information economics and Post Keynesian economics. We conduct simulations re-
flecting increased shareholder value orientation and show that the model produces a number 
of results that appear consistent with many stylised facts particularly of the US economy since 
the early 1980s. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
This article is centred around the notions of shareholder value orientation and financialisation, 
with the former being one (important) constituent of the latter. Shareholder value orientation 
is defined as the increased dominance of shareholders over management and workers in cor-
porate governance. Financialisation is the more general development towards an increased 
importance of the financial sector of the economy relative to the non-financial sector.  
The objectives of the article are the following: first, we develop a synthetic, stock flow 
consistent (SFC) macroeconomic model of financialisation. Thanks to the SFC modelling 
approach, based on computer-based solution methods (see Godley and Lavoie, 2007, for a 
systematic presentation), we can integrate several important facets of financialisation into one 
macroeconomic model, and consider how the effects that are ascribed to this complex phe-
nomenon in partial analyses in the existing literature may be linked. This includes both main-
stream and Post Keynesian contributions. We focus on the implications of financialisation for 
accumulation, profitability, output growth, financial wealth and indebtedness of households 
and firms, and income distribution.  
Second, we conduct simulations on our model and concentrate on two experiments reflect-
ing increasing shareholder value orientation: one is an increase in the dividend payout ratio of 
non-financial firms, the other is a reduction in the contribution of new equity issues to the 
financing of physical investment. We argue that the results of our experiments realistically 
reflect many important stylised facts particularly of the US economy since the early 1980s, 
when the “shareholder revolution” started. Interestingly, the results of our experiments are not 
unique but different “cases” are obtained depending on one strategic parameter value in the 
investment function of the model. Higher dividend payments and lower equity issues can have 
either positive or negative effects on physical accumulation, firms’ profit rate and output 
growth, and different implications for the evolution of households’ and firms’ wealth and in-
debtedness. While these conclusions appear consistent with empirical experience, they gener-
alise the results obtained by Lavoie and Godley (2001-2, pp. 305-7) in their path-breaking 
contribution to SFC modelling within a Post Keynesian framework. In their analysis, share-
holder value orientation, measured in terms of dividend payments and share buybacks, has 
uniquely positive effects on the overall economy. In our model, such outcomes are possible 
but not very likely. Consequently, the model also encompasses more pessimistic views of 
shareholder value orientation, such as that expressed by Stockhammer (2005-6), who observes 
“an interesting puzzle in macroeconomic trends: the ratio of investment to profits […] shows 
a declining trend (p. 197)”. In effect, with the notable exception of the “New Economy” boom 
of the late 1990s, shareholder value orientation seems to be linked to a divergence of macro-2 
economic accumulation and profit rates, which clearly poses a challenge to traditional Post 
Keynesian analysis. We show how this “investment-profit puzzle” can be resolved and what 
implications this has for the other aspects of financialisation mentioned above. 
The article proceeds as follows: in section 2, some important previous work on financiali-
sation and shareholder value orientation is discussed in light of the empirical facts. Section 3 
presents our own synthetic, stock-flow consistent model of an economy containing an indus-
trial sector, a household sector composed of workers and rentiers, a private banking sector, 
and a stock market. The behavioural equations of the model are based on the considerations 
developed in section 2. The simulation results are discussed in section 4 and compared to 
some key conclusions obtained in the existing literature in section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  Models of Financialisation in the Light of Stylised Facts 
 
In this section, we discuss in turn three phenomena associated with shareholder value orienta-
tion and financialisation: the (usually) reduced propensity to invest of non-financial firms; the 
divergence of accumulation and profit rates at the macroeconomic level; and changes in the 
distribution of income. Focusing in particular on the US economy, we relate these empirical 
developments to both mainstream and Post Keynesian theory. 
 
The Growth-Profit Trade-Off, Shareholder Value Orientation and Accumulation 
 
The idea of there being a conflict between an individual firm’s growth and its profitability is 
widely accepted by economists and by public opinion.  
To begin with, a standard intuition is that technical inefficiency problems arise from very 
fast expansion, which makes the acquisition of knowledge about new products and markets 
difficult to organise. This is the well-known “Penrose effect” (Penrose, 1959), or “growth-
profit trade-off” (Stockhammer, 2004, 2005-6) which is a standard concept in both main-
stream and Post Keynesian economics (Lavoie, 1992, pp. 114 et seq.). 
Moreover, it is generally recognised that different groups within a firm, namely manage-
ments on the one hand and shareholders on the other, follow rather conflicting objectives. In 
the Post Keynesian view, managers have traditionally been seen as caring mainly about the 
long-term survival of their firms (and hence jobs, fame and influence), for which high accu-
mulation appears to be the best guarantee: “management wants to maximize the size and 
power of the firm and the share of primary markets in which it operates, not the current value 
of the firm” (Crotty, 1990, p. 533). Conversely, “stockholders typically have only a fleeting 
relation with any particular enterprise” (ibid., p. 534). Their typical criterion for choosing 3 
stocks is the expected rate of return. In the “New Institutional Economics” (NIE) literature, 
managers are conceptualised as the agents of shareholders. However, as management holds at 
most a small fraction of the firm’s equity, it has an incentive “to consume more on the job 
than is agreed on in his contract” (Fama, 1980, p. 296) at the expense of the firm’s present 
value.
1 Many authors have argued that the strengthening of shareholder preferences will there-
fore enhance productive efficiency, by disciplining managements e.g. via high dividend pay-
ments and high leverage reducing the “free cash flow” at the disposal of managements, the 
threat of “mergers and the market for corporate control” (Manne, 1965), a competitive “mar-
ket for managers” (Fama, 1980), and stock-price oriented remuneration schemes. However, 
serious empirical evidence suggests that managers, as they are increasingly aligned to share-
holder preferences, “would avoid initiating a very positive NPV [net present value, TvT] pro-
ject if it meant falling short of the current quarter’s consensus earnings” (Graham et al., 2004, 
p. 1). One explanation for this is that due to asymmetric information, shareholders tend to 
focus on short-term financial returns, while the costs of acquiring knowledge about the actual 
long-term potential of a firm are often prohibitive: “Managers describe a trade-off between 
the short-term need to ‘deliver earnings’ and the long-term objective of making value-
maximizing investment decisions. Executives believe that hitting earnings benchmarks builds 
credibility with the market and helps to maintain or increase their firm’s stock price” (Graham 
et al., 2004, p. 2; for similar conclusions, see, e.g., Porter, 1992, Cheng et al., 2005). Post 
Keynesian authors have focused on the potentially negative effects for effective demand and 
growth associated with a reduced propensity to invest as a result of shareholder value orienta-
tion (e.g. Crotty, 1992; Stockhammer, 2005-6). 
Two well-established stylised facts suggest that shareholder value orientation since the 
early 1980s has indeed tended to contain managements’ desire to accumulate physical capital, 
which was prevalent during the “Fordist era”: first, the increase in firms’ dividend payout 
ratio together with a strong positive correlation between the availability of internal sources of 
finance and physical investment (see figure 1); and second, the very limited, and in fact de-







                                                 
1 Such wasteful (present value-reducing) “benefits in kind” can include “physical appointments of the office”, 
the “attractiveness of the secretarial staff”, or “a larger than optimal computer to play with” (Jensen and Meck-
ling, 1976, p. 312). This trivialisation of managers’ desire to accumulate has always been rejected by Post 
Keynesian and institutionalist authors (e.g. Galbraith, 1969; Eichner, 1976; Lavoie, 1992). 4 






















































Note: Rate of retained profits = Undistributed corporate profits/Corporate profits after tax, net of interest pay-
ments; Accumulation rate = Growth rate of corporate net capital stock. 
 
Sources: NIPA, tables 1.10, 7.11, Fixed Assets Tables, table 6.1 (Bureau of Economic Analy-
sis); author’s calculations. 
 
 























Source: Flow of Funds Accounts (Federal Reserve); Table F.102; author’s calculations. 
 
A high dividend payout ratio is consistent with a policy of “downsize and distribute”, as 
opposed to a strategy of “retain and invest”, traditionally favoured by managements (see La-
zonick and O’Sullivan, 2000). The importance of internal funds for physical investment has 
already been recognised by Kalecki (1937) with his “principle of increasing risk”: firms and 
their creditors face an increasing risk of default with the proportion of external finance in-5 
creasing. Another explanation of firms’ heavy reliance on internal funds is that in “imperfect 
capital markets” with asymmetric information, the providers of external finance will require a 
monetary premium compensating for the risk of management shirking or engaging in very 
risky investment projects, which may lead to adverse selection (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). As 
for equity finance, existing shareholders will often resist the augmentation of a firm’s own 
capital: the (announcement of the) emission of new equities will be interpreted by sharehold-
ers as a signal that the management considers the firm to be overvalued, hence inducing 
shareholders to sell the firm’s stock with the result of a decline in its price. However, both 
dividend payments and share buybacks, while stimulating the rate of return on equity, at least 
in the short run, reduce firms’ internal funds and hence potentially long-run accumulation. 
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Note: Debt = Credit market instruments; Capital Stock = Replacement cost of structures. 
Source: Flow of Funds Accounts; Table B.102; author’s calculations. 
 
The overwhelming majority of empirical studies on financial structure indicate indeed that 
“retained earnings are by far and away the dominant source of finance in all countries” 
(Mayer and Sussman, 2002; see also Mayer, 1988, Rajan and Zingales, 1995).
2 Corbett and 
Jenkinson (1997) show that for US non-financial private enterprises the contribution of inter-
nal funds to the financing of physical investment has increased from about 75 per cent in the 
early 1970s to above 100 per cent in the 1990s. Also, the contribution of new equity to the 
 
2 Interestingly, Corbett and Jenkinson (1997) find that in the US and the UK – countries with so-called “market-
based” financial systems – firms relied more heavily on internal means of finance than in Germany and Japan, 
where the financial system was traditionally considered “bank-based”, during 1970-94. In the US and the UK, 
the contribution of new equity to the financing of investment was negative, while it was positive (but small) in 
Germany and Japan.  6 
financing of investment has been negative in the US since the early 1980s, while it had been 
positive but small in earlier decades (see figure 2). In fact, there are many theoretical explana-
tions of why debt finance is usually preferred over equity finance, when internal funds are not 
sufficiently available (for surveys, see Harris and Raviv, 1991, and Frank and Goyal, 2005). 
One important result in many theories is the existence of a creditor-shareholder conflict: 
shareholders typically wish to stimulate the potential return on equity via relatively risky and 
highly leveraged investment strategies, while bondholders and banks advocate more conserva-
tive investments and fear that high leverage ratios increase the risk of default. Therefore, in-
creasing leverage ratios of firms can be an indirect result of shareholder value orientation, 
when firms increasingly distribute dividends to shareholders and restrict equity issues. Figure 
3 shows that firms’ leverage has indeed been increasing since the early 1980s. 
There is also econometric evidence that shareholder value orientation contributed to the 
slowdown of accumulation in the past decades (see, e.g., Stockhammer, 2004; van Treeck, 
2007). However, figures 1-3 point to one important exception, namely the “New Economy” 
boom of the late 1990s. During this period, accumulation strongly recovered, while dividend 
payments were very high and firms bought back shares. This pattern corresponds to what 
Lavoie and Godley (2001-2, pp. 306-7) seem to consider as representative of the functioning 
of a “monetary economy”. As will be seen below, in our model shareholder value orientation 
can affect accumulation either positively or negatively.  
 
The “Investment-Profit Puzzle” and the Surge in Financial Wealth and Consumer Credit 
 
The “investment-profit puzzle” (Stockhammer, 2005-6) describes an interesting phenomenon 
in a number of developed economies since the early 1980s, where accumulation has generally 
been declining while profit rates have shown a tendency to rise. As is well known, traditional 
Post Keynesian analysis formalises a “double-sided [positive] relationship between the rate of 
profit and the rate of accumulation” (Robinson, 1962, p. 12). This is most obvious in the 
Cambridge equation, which has the accumulation rate as “a function of the rate of profit that 
induces it” and the profit rate as “a function of the rate of accumulation that generates it” 
(Robinson, 1962, p. 48). Figure 4 indicates that the macroeconomic relationship between in-
vestment and profits has considerably weakened in the US since the early 1980s, with the 




                                                 
3 Duménil and Lévy (2001, p. 589) calculate a profit rate for the total private US economy and show that it has 
heavily declined from the mid-1960s to the early 1980s, but has been strongly recovering since then. 7 
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Source: NIPA, table 1.10; Fixed Assets Tables, table 5.9; author’s calculations. 
 
In an attempt to propose one potential solution to the “investment-profit puzzle”, van 
Treeck (2007) and Hein and van Treeck (2007) have included terms capturing shareholder 
value orientation in the investment function of their respective models. In both models, an 
increase in the dividend payout ratio can have different effects on accumulation, profit rate 
and capacity utilisation. One possibility is an “intermediate case”, in which higher dividend 
payments depress the accumulation rate but the surge in consumption out of capital income 
stimulates the profit rate. Similar solutions to the “investment-profit puzzle” are discussed by 
Van de Velde (2005, pp. 184 et seq.), Cordonnier (2006) and Lavoie (2006, p. 20).  
The aforementioned models do not explicitly take into account the interaction between 
flows and stocks, such as the importance of financial wealth for investment and consumption, 
which is a crucial element of financialisation. Rudimentary analyses hereof are Boyer (2000), 
Aglietta (2000) and Stockhammer (2005-6). In these models, shareholder value orientation 
exerts a direct negative effect on investment, but is also linked to rising stock prices and hence 
financial wealth of households, which in turn stimulates consumption (and possibly invest-
ment via Tobin’s q). However, the channels by which shareholder value orientation stimulates 
equity prices are not entirely clear in these models. While Tobin’s q is exogenous in Boyer 
(2000), in Stockhammer (2005-6) wealth is a simple linear function in profits. A more con-
vincing treatment is proposed by Lavoie and Godley (2001-2), where stock prices are jointly 
determined by the supply of equity decided by firms and households’ portfolio choice.  
An interesting weakness in many models of wealth-based growth is pointed at by Bhaduri 
et al. (2006). It is recalled that stock market wealth is purely “virtual wealth (which) is realiz-8 
able individually or on a micro-, but not collectively on a macro-scale” (p. 414). Clearly, were 
a sufficiently large number of shareholders to sell their stocks in order to increase consump-
tion, stock prices would decline and virtual wealth be destroyed. Hence, “the institutional ar-
rangements of an overdraft economy become essential to maintain a boom fuelled by credit 
rather than realized capital gains.” (ibid., p. 414).
4 Figure 5 shows that the decline in the per-
sonal savings rate in recent times has indeed been associated with a rapid increase in both 
household wealth and indebtedness. Interestingly, the massive decline in the US personal sav-
ings rate in the recent past can be fully explained by the reduced propensity to save of the 
highest income quintile alone, which holds 80-90 per cent of equity and has particularly bene-
fited from both dividend payments and rising financial wealth (see Maki and Palumbo, 2001).  
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Source: Flow of Funds Accounts, tables F.100, B.100; NIPA, table 2.1; author’s calculations. 
                                                 
4 As emphasised by Dutt (2006, p. 343), the expansion of consumer credit has been facilitated by the “deregula-
tion of the financial system allowing home equity lending, adjustable consumer loans and securitization […], and 
technological changes in credit reporting in the USA in the 1980s […]”. 9 
The analysis of Bhaduri et al. (2006) is particularly interesting because it derives condi-
tions under which “the level of real income and, of virtual wealth may be seen to move in 
opposite directions” (p. 418). This possibility arises because wealth-based consumption, while 
having expansionary effects in the first place, may raise the debt/income ratio of households 
and hence both reduce creditworthiness and increase interest and repayment obligations. As a 
result, households’ propensity to consume would need to decline again in the longer run. Such 
considerations will also be integrated in our synthetic model of financialisation. 
 
Financialisation and Income Distribution 
 
Financialisation has been accompanied by an increasing share of profits in national income 
(see figure 6). Hein (2006, 2007) has integrated the distribution effects of monetary policy 
into a Post Keynesian model of growth and distribution and argued that rising interest rates 
are likely to be translated into higher prices by firms, that is, firms’ mark-up and hence the 
profit share are “interest-elastic”. In our view, this idea can be readily extended to shareholder 
value orientation, which, according to many analyses, has also contributed to the decline in 
the share of wages in national income (see, e.g., Boyer, 2000). 
 
Figure 6:  Share of Profits in National Income (Right Scale), Ratio of Financial Sector Profits 







































Sources: AMECO database, NIPA, table 6.16; author’s calculations. 
 
Another aspect of financialisaion is the rapid increase in financial sector profits relative to 
non-financial sector profits (figure 6), which is to a large extent due to the rapid expansion of 
financial wealth as well as to the increase of corporate and consumer debt (figures 3 and 5). 10 
Clearly, banks, pension and mutual funds, which administer the overwhelming part of house-
hold wealth and debt, benefit from administration fees and interest payments.
5
A further corollary of shareholder value orientation appears to be the increasing gap be-
tween manager wages and blue collar wages.
6 Palley (2006) and Lavoie (2006) have analysed 
this phenomenon of “cadrisme” (Lavoie, 2006) within the framework of Post Keynesian mod-
els of growth and distribution. In our view, shareholder value orientation is closely related to 
the redistribution from blue collar to management wages. As mentioned above, management 
income is nowadays to a large extent “performance-related”, that is, closely linked to corpo-
rate profits and financial returns (via e.g. stock options and remuneration pegged to profits or 
stock prices). Therefore, as managements increasingly adopt (or are forced to adopt) share-
holder interests, manager income for the purposes of analysis (although not in terms of na-
tional accounts) can be understood as part of distributed profits.  
In the next section, we present our simple stock-flow consistent macro model, which at-
tempts to encompass both the theoretical work and the stylised facts sketched above. 
 
3.  A Synthetic, Stock-Flow Consistent Model 
 
The accounting framework of our model is inspired by and in many aspects similar to the 
seminal work of Lavoie and Godley (2001-2). Unlike the latter, however, our model includes 
an explicit distinction between workers and rentiers who together constitute the household 
sector, as in Dos Santos and Zezza (2006). Another extension is that households have access 
to credit in our model, as in Godley and Lavoie (2007, pp. 378 et seq.). Also, banks make 
profits in our model. In this section, the main focus is on the behavioural equations of the 
model, which are based on the arguments developed in the previous section. Adding a number 
of accounting identities, we obtain a full stock-flow consistent macro model with a total of 57 
equations and relevant definitions.
 7  
The accounting framework of the model is given by the balance sheet and transactions 
matrices in tables 1 and 2. The subscripts d and s denote demand and supply, r, w, and f re-
spectively are rentiers’, workers’, and firms’ demand. For example, the third row in the bal-
ance sheet matrix says that the supply of loans, Ls, must be equal to the demand of loans by 
rentiers, Lr, and firms, Lf. Our model describes a pure Wicksellian credit economy, where 
                                                 
5 Not only banks and other financial intermediaries increasingly rely on the granting of loans as a source of prof-
its. As an interesting piece of  anecdotic evidence, note that in 2004Q2, “both General Motors and Ford earn(ed) 
more from providing auto and mortgages loans than from selling cars” (Chancellor, 2005, p. 162). 
6 In the US, the share of wages paid to the nine lower income quintiles has declined by about 12 percentage 
points during 1970-2000. During 1980-2000, the share received by the highest 1 per cent income fractile has 
approximately doubled from around 5 per cent to above 10 per cent (Piketty and Saez, 2003, table A2). 
7 An EViews programme of the model and the simulations can be obtained from the author on request. 11 
money, Ms, is created by private banks and takes the form of deposits, Mr. Workers only re-
ceive wages, Ws, and spend all wage income on consumption, Cw. They do not have access to 
loans, L. Rentiers hold all household net worth, V. They receive dividends, FD, from firms, 
and interests on deposits, imM(-1), from banks, with im being the interest rate on deposits, M. 
They also pay interests on loans, ilLr(-1). Banks make profits, ilL(-1) – imM(-1), but they distribute 
all their profits, FB, to rentiers.
8 Firms produce consumption goods, Cs, and capital goods, Is, 
and pay wages, Wd, to workers, dividends to rentiers and interests to banks. Investment is fi-
nanced via undistributed profits, FU, new bank loans, ∆Lf, and new equity issues, ∆espe, 
where es is the quantity of equity supplied, and pe is the price of equity. 
 
Table 1: Balance Sheet Matrix 
 
 Households  Firms  Banks  TOTAL 
 Workers  Rentiers    
Money   +  Mr  –  Ms 0 
Equities   +  erpe – espe  0 
Loans   –  Lr – Lf + Ls 0 
Capital      + K    + K 
TOTAL  
(net worth) 
0  V  K – espe – Lf 0 +  K 
 
Table 2: Transactions Matrix  
 
 Households  Firms  Banks  TOTAL 
 Workers  Rentiers Current Capital Current Capital  0 
Consumption –  Cw – Cr + Cs     0 
Investment     +  Is – Id    0 
Wages +  Ws  –  Wd     0 
Profits    + FD  – FT  + FU      0 
Interestsloans   – ilLr,-1 – ilLf,-1  +  ilL-1  0 
Interestsdeposits  +  imM-1    –  imM-1  0 
Bank profits    + FB      – FB    0 
∆ loans    + ∆Lr  +  ∆Lf  –  ∆Ls 0 
∆ money    – ∆Mr     +  ∆Ms 0 
Issues of equi-
ties 
 –  ∆erpe  +  ∆espe    0 
TOTAL    0  0 0 0 0 0  0 
 
In what follows, we present the behavioural equations and some important definitions: 
 
Firms: Investment, Pricing, and Financing Decisions 
 
) 1 ( 4 ) 1 ( 3 ) 1 ( 2 ) 1 ( 1 0 − − − − + + − + = u q DIVK r g cf
i γ γ γ γ γ  (1) 
                                                 
8 In the aggregate, rentiers recover at the end of each period all profits made by banks from making loans to 
rentiers at the beginning of the same period. 12 
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) 1 )( )( 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 2 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( − − − − + − − = g L i FT s FD f l f  (6) 
 
K p e L q e s f / ) ( + =  (7) 
 
pot y y u / = , with  ,   (8)  v K y
pot / =
pot y K v / =
 
s s I C y + =  (9) 
 
µ ρ / ) 1 ( r w p + =     (10) 
 
)] 1 ( 1 [ * 0 f s − + = ρ ρ  (11) 
 
y FT )] 1 /( [ ρ ρ + =  (12) 
 
) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( − − = − d e s s xI p e e    (13) 
 
Equation 1 is the investment function. The accumulation rate depends positively on the rate of 
retained profits, rcf, Tobin’s q, and the rate of capacity utilisation, u. The rate of retained prof-
its is defined in equation 2, where r is the overall rate of profit (equation 3), ilLEV is the ratio 
of interest payments to capital stock, with LEV  being firms’ leverage ratio (equation 4), and 
DIVK is the ratio of dividend payments to capital stock (equation 5). A strategic parameter is 
sf, the retention rate of profit, in equation 6: in each period, a fraction (1 – sf) of (expected) 
profits net of interest payments is distributed to shareholders. The definition of Tobin’s q 
(equation 7) obtains from firms’ balance sheet (table 1). Whenever stock market capitalisation 
is equal to the replacement costs of capital stock, we have q = 1. The rate of capacity utilisa-
tion is defined in equation 8, with the capital/full capacity ratio, v, technologically given.
9  
Notice that equation 1 is very close to the investment function used by Lavoie and Godley 
(2001-2) and Ndikumana (1999), but in our model the variable DIVK plays the strategic role, 
while in the models of Ndikumana and Lavoie and Godley, the focus is on ilLEV. Ndikumana 
and Lavoie and Godley effectively assume that interest payments have a stronger negative 
                                                 
9 The macroeconomic relation between investment and productive efficiency is not explicitly analysed. On the 
one hand, the “Penrose effect” discussed in section 2 may lead to a positive effect of g on v and/or a negative 
effect on µ (equation 10). On the other, investment is likely to favour technological progress (e.g. Kaldor, 1957). 13 
effect on accumulation than dividend payments (ilLEV enters their investment function twice 
with a negative coefficient, once directly and once indirectly by reducing the cash flow). In 
our view, while both interest and dividend payments are costs from the point of view of man-
agement, the variable DIVK furthermore proxies shareholders’ influence in corporate govern-
ance (see also Hein and van Treeck, 2007). Following the arguments presented in section 2, 
shareholder value orientation can be expected to significantly restrict both managers’ ability 
and their willingness to invest. Note also that econometric estimation for the US by van 
Treeck (2007) suggests that net dividend payments have had a stronger negative effect on 
accumulation than net interest payments in recent decades. At the same time, as indicated by 
US national accounts, the ratio of net dividend payments to net interest payments made by 
businesses has significantly increased during the past two decades or so. In van Treeck (2007) 
and Hein and van Treeck (2007), we have extended more traditional Kaleckian investment 
function for arguments capturing shareholder value orientation. In the present context, the 
investment function in equation 1 has been chosen because it encompasses both Post Keynes-
ian and mainstream theories of investment, including q-theory in the tradition of Tobin (for a 
discussion of q-theory, see Crotty (1990) and Tobin and Brainard (1990)).  
Equations 10-12 describe the standard Kaleckian pricing procedure in a one-good world. 
Price, p, is obtained from applying a mark-up, ρ, over unit labour costs, wr/µ. There is no in-
flation, and price is normalised to unity. Firms can hire as many workers as they wish at the 
exogenously given wage rate.
10 In the goods market, supply adjusts to demand, y, in each pe-
riod (equation 9). The mark-up is elastic with respect to changes in the dividend payout ratio, 
(1 – sf), which is a variation of Hein’s (2006, 2007) “interest-elastic mark-up” discussed 
above.  
According to equation 13, firms finance a fixed proportion x of investment via the emis-
sion of new equities, irrespective of their price, as in Kaldor (1966) and Lavoie and Godley 
(2001-2). It follows that firms’ demand of new loans for financing investment is a residual, 
given the amount of undistributed profits and new equities. 
 
Households: Consumption, Borrowing, and Portfolio Decisions 
 
r dr s r w d L a Y a W C C C ∆ + + = + = 2
exp
1  (14) 
 
FB L i M r FD Y r l d m dr + − + = − − ) 1 ( ) 1 (    (15) 
                                                 
10 We set wr = 1 and µ = 1 + ρ so that, contrary to usual formalisation, the real wage does not depend on the 
mark-up. Rather, a higher mark-up implies that a given output level is produced with fewer workers, with labour 
demand (and employment) given by Nd (= Ns) = y/µ. Thus, the mark-up determines the share of profits in na-
tional income (equation 12), which is the important relation in our context. Wages are given as Wd = Ws = Ndwr. 14 
) 1 (
exp
1 ) 1 ( − − − = ∆ r r repL V BUR b L  (16) 
  
dr r l r Y L i repL BUR / ) ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( − − + =  (17) 
 
exp exp
3 ) 1 ( 2 1 0
exp / ) / ( V Y re i V e p dr m d e λ λ λ λ − + − = −  (18) 
 
) 1 ( ) 1 ( / ) ( − − + = d e e p CG FD re  (19) 
 
Equation 14 is the consumption function. As is obvious from the balance sheet matrix, all 
wages are consumed. Rentiers consume part of their expected
11 disposable income, Ydr, de-
fined in equation 15, and a fraction of new net loans, ∆Lr, which are granted to them by banks 
on the basis of expected financial wealth, V, which serves as collateral (equation 16), similar 
as in Bhaduri et al. (2006, equation 11, p. 420). The higher rentiers’ burden of debt, BUR, 
defined in equation 17, the lower their creditworthiness. In each period, rentiers repay a frac-
tion rep of their outstanding debt. Equation 18 reflects rentiers’ portfolio choice following 
standard Tobinesque principles, as in e.g. Lavoie and Godley (2001-2) and Dos Santos and 
Zezza (2006).
12 The demand for equities as a share of total wealth depends on an exogenous 
target proportion, λ0, and furthermore positively on the rate of return of equity, re, and nega-
tively on the interest rate on deposits and expected income (transactions demand for money). 
Equation 19 defines the rate of return on equity as the sum of dividends and capital gains, CG, 
divided by (lagged) market capitalisation.  
 
Banks: Interest and Lending Decisions 
 
) 1 ( ) 1 ( − − − = s m s l M i L i FB  (20) 
 
m b l r i ) 1 ( ρ + =  (21) 
 
d s L L =   (22) 
 
s s L M =   (23) 
 
Banks make profits, FB (equation 20), as the interest rate on loans exceeds that on deposits by 
a factor (1 + b ρ ) (equation 21). Banks grant as many loans as are demanded (equation 22), 
given the restriction from equation 16. Loans are equal in value to deposits (equation 23). 
                                                 
11 Following Lavoie and Godley (2001-2), expectations in our model are adaptive (except stock market expecta-
tions), so that e.g.  , with   being the rate of growth of rentier disposable income.  
) 1 ( ) 1 (
exp ) ˆ 1 ( − − + = dr dr dr Y Y Y dr Y ˆ
12 Expected market capitalisation, (pees)
exp is equal to actual market capitalisation, pees. 15 
Income distribution 
 
Equations 24-26 define the share of profits in national income, h, the rentier share in house-
hold disposable income, hr, and the share of bank profits in total profits, hb, respectively. 
 
y FT h / ) 1 /( = + = ρ ρ  (24) 
 
) /( d dr dr r W Y Y h + =  (25) 
 




The only price that is endogenously determined by the interaction of supply and demand is 
the price of equity (see Lavoie and Godley (2001-2, p. 293)). Therefore it holds that  
 
s d e e = .  (27) 
 
Equation (28) is a redundant equation insofar as it is logically implied by the setup of the 
stock-flow consistent system. Hence, we refind the well-known result that the equality of 
“money demand” and “money supply” is not an equilibrium condition but follows from the 
very logic of a monetary production economy, in which money is endogenous: 
 
d s M M = . (28) 
 
4.  Experiments 
 
Below, we discuss in turn the effects of an increase in the dividend payout ratio, (1 – sf), and 
of a reduction in the proportion of new equity issues in investment finance, x. After finding a 
stable baseline steady state for our model using reasonable parameter values (reported in the 
Appendix) and initial values for the endogenous variables, we shock the relevant parameter 
and follow the reaction of some important variables relative to their baseline values. No par-
ticular importance should be attached to the unit of time underlying our simulations. In our 
subsequent discussion, we mainly focus on the “long run”, which in our context should be 
thought of as a period of no more than a few years.  
 
Effects of a Higher Dividend Payout Ratio 
 
As for our first experiment, three cases can be distinguished which arise from the variation of 
the coefficient on Tobin’s q in the investment function. It is small in the “normal case”, large 16 
in the “puzzling case” and takes an intermediate value in the “intermediate case”.  
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In the intermediate case (figure 7a), the profit rate increases in the long run despite a de-
cline in the accumulation rate, following an increase in the dividend payout ratio (see panel a). 
The intuition behind this solution to the “investment-profit puzzle” is that an increased divi-
dend payout ratio hampers both firms’ ability and willingness to invest, while rentiers (which 
includes managers, as discussed above) increase their consumption. This is possible for two 
reasons: first, higher dividend income (and higher interest income resulting from increased 
leverage of firms, as discussed below) directly increases rentiers’ disposable income and 
hence consumption opportunities. Second, part of the increment in rentier income is invested 
on the stock market, which stimulates rentiers’ financial wealth. This, in turn, allows (ini-
tially) for a faster expansion of consumer credit, further contributing to higher capitalist con-
sumption. Formally, the drop in g is overcompensated for by the increase in Cr/K: “capitalists 
get what they spend” (r = g + Cr/K). Note that the increase in Tobin’s q (panel b) stabilises 
accumulation somewhat in the longer run, but this indirect effect is weaker than the direct 
negative effect emanating from the higher dividend payout ratio. The increase in the profit 17 
share explains why the profit rate reacts more favourably to the higher dividend payout ratio 
than the rate of capacity utilisation, given that r = (FT/y)(y/y
pot)(y
pot/K) = hu/v. 
Of course, there are important drawbacks to this accumulation regime: first, shareholder 
value orientation is associated with higher financial fragility. As shown in panel b, firms’ lev-
erage ratio increases, following the reduction in their internal means of finance and the slow-
down in accumulation, and exhibits only a sluggish tendency to stabilise in the long run. 
Similarly, rentiers’ burden of debt increases slightly in the long run, after dropping sharply on 
impact. Although, by construction, rentiers in the aggregate are a net creditor in our model, a 
higher burden of debt may make financial distress for some households more likely, in case 
an unexpected event triggers a financial asset deflation. Furthermore, the increasing burden of 
debt reduces rentiers’ ability to secure new consumer credit. According to our simulations, 
rentiers’ propensity to consume out of their disposable income first increases, but then de-
clines again, and stabilises at almost exactly its baseline value in the long run.  
Panel c of figure 7a shows the implications of shareholder value orientation for the distri-
bution of income. The share of wages in national income declines due to the dividend-elastic 
mark-up. Simultaneously, the share of rentier/manager income in household income increases 
as a combined result of the decline in the wage share and the redistribution from retained 
profits to dividends and interests. Also, the share of bank profits in total profits increases due 
to the higher leverage of firms.  
Panel d indicates that the virtual economy (financial wealth) and the real economy (out-
put) temporarily move in opposite directions,
13 as envisaged by Bhaduri et al. (2006) in a dif-
ferent framework. Clearly, the increase in wealth is not enough to trigger an investment and 
growth boom. Eventually, rentier income too falls below its baseline value, despite the redis-
tribution of income. In the long run, financial wealth starts to slowly decline, too.  
As a general conclusion, the intermediate case describes a perfectly sustainable scenario, 
with all important ratios, such as the profit rate, accumulation rate, output growth, rentiers’ 
burden of debt, or firms’ leverage ratio, eventually yielding stable values following the initial 
shock. Nevertheless, the drop in accumulation may seriously endanger long-term real eco-
nomic development. Although the slowdown of output growth is relatively modest in our 
simulations,
14 the long-term effects on productive capacity and potential output may be sub-
stantial due to the negative effects of lower accumulation on productivity growth, which are 
not incorporated in our model. Yet, our simulation results show that rentiers clearly benefit 
                                                 
13 The result remains unchanged, when stock market capitalisation instead of rentiers’ net worth is taken to rep-
resent the virtual economy. 
14 Output growth stabilises at about 3.2 per cent, which is 0.15 percentage points lower compared to baseline. 18 
from the increased dividend payout ratio over a considerable period of time, in terms of both 
relative and absolute income gains. 
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Figure 7b reports the results for the normal case. Here, the decline in the retention rate re-
duces both the accumulation rate and the profit rate and capacity utilisation (panel a). This is 
due to the absence of a sufficiently strong positive effect of Tobin’s q on accumulation.  
Another main difference compared to the intermediate case is that firms’ leverage ratio 
does not stabilise in the long run but increases apparently without bound (panel b). This is 
reminiscent of Steindl’s (1976, pp. 113 et seq.) “paradox of debt”: although firms cut invest-
ment expenditure, their leverage ratio not only increases but potentially explodes in an ad-
verse macroeconomic environment (see also Lavoie, 1995, and Hein, 2006, 2007). Similarly, 
rentiers’ burden of debt increases sooner and heavier than in the intermediate case, thereby 
reducing the initial positive effect of rentier consumption on the profit rate and output. Note 
that, as a consequence, the propensity to consume out of rentier income, after an initial hike, 
soon declines relative to its baseline value without stabilising in the long run. 
As shown in panel d, the virtual and the real economy follow a common downward trend 19 
in the long run, with financial wealth initially increasing but eventually declining relative to 
the baseline scenario. Rentier income also declines very quickly compared to baseline. In con-
junction with the distributionary implications shown in panel c, we obtain as a special case a 
result formulated by Dos Santos and Zezza (2006, p. 16): “Any attempt at increasing distrib-
uted profits, at the expenses of firms’ retained profits, will provide only temporary benefits to 
owners of equities, since the drop in gross profit generated by slower growth and the higher 
cost of borrowing will slowly offset the initial gain. The only beneficiary of this redistribution 
of income will be the banking sector, which will increase its stock of loans to firms and thus 
obtain a growing stream of interest payments.” Interestingly, the redistribution in favour of 
banks is considerably more pronounced in the normal case than it is in the intermediate case, 
as both firms’ leverage and rentiers’ burden of debt increase much stronger.  
As an overall conclusion, the normal case describes an unstable scenario, that is, some 
important ratios, including the accumulation rate, firms’ leverage ratio and the share of bank 
profits in total profits, do not converge to sustainable levels even in the very long run. The 
redistribution towards profits and rentier income is linked to overall economic stagnation. 
In the puzzling case (figure 7c), the lower retention rate is accompanied by higher accu-
mulation, profit rate, and capacity utilisation in the long run (see panel a). The reason is that 
higher rentier income stimulates consumption and stock market wealth, with the increase in 
Tobin’s q exhibiting a very strong positive effect on investment.  
As shown in panel b, firms’ leverage increases less than in the normal and intermediate 
cases and quickly converges to a new stable level, which is again consistent with the paradox 
of debt: firms steadily increase investment expenditure and take ever-higher amounts of loans, 
but due to favourable macroeconomic circumstances their debt/capital ratio stabilises at a 
moderate level. Rentiers’ burden of debt even declines relative to its baseline value. Note that, 
as a corollary, rentiers’ propensity to consume soon stabilises at a permanently higher level. 
Notice that, due to the favourable development of firms’ and households’ interest obliga-
tions, the share of financial sector profits in total profits increases far less than in the normal 
and intermediate cases (panel c). 
Finally, virtual and real economy move in the same direction, with financial wealth and 
output significantly increasing compared to baseline (panel d).  
The puzzling case features stable results, with all important ratios yielding stable values in 
the long run. Note that this applies also to the rate of return on equity, which, while initially 
rising in all cases, eventually falls below its baseline value in the normal and intermediate 
cases. In the puzzling case, shareholder value orientation positively affects the rate of return 
on equity, rentier income, but also the overall economy.  20 
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Effects of a Reduced Proportion of New Equity Issues in Investment Finance 
 
Figure 8 displays the results of our second experiment. Now, two cases can be distinguished, 
depending on the value of Tobin’s q. In the normal case (panel a), the coefficient on Tobin’s q 
in the investment function is very low, as in the normal case from figure 7a. In this case, ac-
cumulation slows down because firms need to finance a larger proportion of investment with 
bank loans with the result of higher leverage and higher interest obligations. At the same time, 
the relative reduction in the quantity of equities supplied boosts rentiers’ interest income and 
stock market wealth and hence consumption. This effect is so strong that the profit rate in-
creases so that we obtain a further potential solution to the “investment-profit puzzle”.  
The rate of return on equity first strongly increases but then starts to decline and falls be-
hind its baseline value in the long run. Output follows a similar pattern. At first, the increase 
in consumption has expansionary effects, but in the longer run, these are overwhelmed by the 
drop in accumulation. Firms’ leverage ratio stabilises only very sluggishly.  
 21 
Figure 8: Effects of a Decrease in New Issues of Equity 
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As panel a is not very informative about the interaction of the virtual and the real econ-
omy in the sense of Bhaduri et al. (2006), we show the reaction of some important variables 
over a longer period in panel b.
15 It can be seen that financial wealth and output eventually 
 
15 For this experiment, we have simulated a larger reduction of new equity issues. This does not alter the qualita-
tive results. 22 
move in opposite directions, after the initial hike in output. At first, both financial wealth and 
rentier consumption increase, while output is already declining. Then, as rentiers’ burden of 
debt starts increasing, their ability to secure new consumer credit is weakened, with the result 
of a lower propensity to consume and a lower level of consumption out of rentier income, 
compared to baseline. In a final phase, financial wealth also starts decreasing, but even after a 
considerable period of time it is still substantially higher than its baseline value, while output 
is much lower compared to baseline.  
Panel c of figure 8 shows the results of the puzzling case. Its essential results obtain when 
the coefficient on Tobin’s q in the investment function takes the value of either the intermedi-
ate or the puzzling case from the preceding experiment. It resembles largely the puzzling case 
from the preceding experiment. That is, a positive reaction of the overall economy appears to 
be more likely in the case of reduced equity issues than in the case of higher dividend pay-
ments. As shown in the figure, accumulation rate, profit rate, and the rate of return on equity 
increase and stabilise quickly after the initial shock. This is because investment is stimulated 
by the increase of Tobin’s q, resulting from the relative decline of the supply of equities, and 
this effect is stronger than the negative effect of rising interest obligations.  
Firms’ leverage ratio converges quickly to a moderately higher level, compared to base-
line. Rentiers’ burden of debt reaches a permanently lower level, resulting in a higher propen-
sity to consume out of rentier income. Real and virtual economy move closely together. 
 
5.  The Simulation Results in Light of the Stylised Facts and in Comparison with Re-
sults from Previous Models of Financialisation 
 
The experience of the stock-market driven “New Economy” boom in the US in the late 
1990s has provoked an increased academic interest in the possibility of a “finance-led growth 
regime” (Boyer (2000)). Our simulation results (and recent empirical evidence) suggest, how-
ever, that some of the conclusions drawn in earlier work may have been somewhat too opti-
mistic in this respect. Most prominently, in Lavoie and Godley (2001-2), “with the chosen 
parameters, […] an increase in the retention ratio does have a negative effect on the [long-
run] rate of growth of the economy” (pp. 306-7). Similarly, it is concluded that “(l)arger is-
sues of equities have detrimental effects on a monetary economy, leading to a fall in the 
growth rate, the rate of profit, and the rate of return on equities. […] Reciprocally, when com-
panies buy back their shares from households, as done in the late 1990s, it should have a posi-
tive effect on the overall economy” (ibid, p. 306). The same general conclusions are drawn by 
Skott and Ryoo (2007), who have reviewed the macroeconomic implications of financialisa-23 
tion in stock-flow consistent frameworks of both Harrodian and Kaleckian inspiration.
16
In contrast, the results of our first experiment in the previous section suggest that an in-
crease in the dividend payout ratio will not necessarily be expansionary. On the contrary, 
while our normal case (figure 7b) appears to be most in line with traditional Post Keynesian 
convictions (and perhaps accumulation dynamics prior to the 1980s), the intermediate case 
(figure 7a) is a solution to the “investment-profit puzzle”, recognised previously by some au-
thors (e.g. Stockhammer (2005-6)), and an approximation of the empirical accumulation re-
gime in the US and possibly other countries since the early 1980s. As shown in figure 1 
above, the share of profits distributed to shareholders substantially increased during this pe-
riod, while accumulation declined most of the time. The long-run results in our puzzling case 
(figure 7c) may correspond to the growth dynamics of the so-called New Economy boom of 
the late 1990s, which saw dividend payments rising along with accumulation, but this period 
was clearly exceptional.  
Note also that our model, with the underlying conception of management remuneration as 
part of distributed profits, reaches the “most significant result” of Lavoie (2006): “increases in 
managerial costs may have either positive or negative effects on rates of capacity utilization, 
profit rates, growth rates and net profits shares [= profits minus management remuneration, 
TvT], even when propensities to save out of wages and salaries are assumed away” (p. 23). 
Notice further that all the essential results of our first experiment can also be obtained 
with more standard variants of Post Keynesian investment functions. For instance, van Treeck 
(2007) and Hein and van Treeck (2007) have extended the well-known model by Bhaduri and 
Marglin (1990). In these models, shareholder value orientation can have different effects on 
equilibrium accumulation, profit rate and capacity utilisation, depending on the sensitivity of 
investment with respect to changes in the dividend payout ratio, the profit share and capacity 
utilisation, and rentiers’ propensity to consume. As in the present model, a normal, an inter-
mediate and a puzzling case can be distinguished. 
As for our second experiment, only the puzzling case (figure 8) is consistent with the re-
sults obtained by Lavoie and Godley (2001-2) and Skott and Ryoo (2007). Admittedly, in the 
late 1990s, when accumulation temporarily recovered, the contribution of new equities to the 
financing of physical investment was highly negative and declining relative to the early 1990s 
(see figure 2 above). However, during 1985-1989 and 2000-2006, investment activity was 
                                                 
16 “The two perspectives are quite different, but our results in this paper show that when it comes to an evalua-
tion of the effects of the changes in financial behavior over the last 30 years, the qualitative conclusions are 
rather similar. A downward shift of the accumulation (function) will be contractionary; decreases in retained 
earnings, a decline in new issues of equity and increased reliance on external finance, on the other hand, will 
tend to be expansionary in both frameworks (Skott and Ryoo (2007, p. 25))”.  24 
particularly weak (see figures 1, 4), while firms engaged in extremely large share buybacks. 
During the same periods, profits developed very positively (see figure 4), which is reminis-
cent of the normal case in terms of figure 8.  
Note that the essential results of our second experiment are also robust to changes in the 
specification of the investment function. However, when Tobin’s q is excluded from the in-
vestment function, the puzzling case in terms of figure 8 becomes, of course, less likely. 
The conclusions obtained from our experiments complement the results derived by 
Lavoie’s (1995) “Minsky-Steindl model” and by Hein’s (2006, 2007) extensions of this 
model. These models focus on interest rate variations, which can have different effects on 
accumulation, profit rate, and capacity utilisation. Also, conditions under which the leverage 
ratio converges to a stable level, following a change in the interest rate, are formally derived. 
The approach taken in our model is similar, but has focused on changes in shareholder value 
orientation rather than interest rate variations. Clearly, stock market effects on investment, 
various forms of income redistribution as well as wealth-based and credit-fuelled consump-
tion, as analysed in our model, are further elements of a synthesis of Minskyan reasoning and 
a Steindlian/Kaleckian macroeconomic framework. In our simulations, shareholder value ori-
entation is associated with a redistribution of income at the expense of (blue collar) workers 
and in favour of rentiers. While this is consistent with the empirical facts (figure 6), it is also 
linked to stagnationist effects on the overall economy in the normal and intermediate cases of 
our simulations, which is a confirmation of traditional Kaleckian insights. Notice also that 
figures 3 and 5 above, although certainly not providing robust empirical proof, can in part be 
interpreted as evidence in favour of Steindl’s paradox of debt, as analysed in the previous 
section. During the 1980s, when accumulation declined, firms’ leverage heavily increased, 
even more strongly than during the 1990s, when accumulation and output growth was much 
higher. Household indebtedness experienced an unprecedented hike in recent years, while 
accumulation and output growth have been considerably weaker than during the 1990s.  
Furthermore, our simulation results seem to confirm the warning expressed by Bhaduri et 
al. (2006, p. 426), according to which “it is misleading to accept blindly the performance of 
the stock market as a reliable barometer of the health of the real economy”. In effect, our pro-
posed solutions to the “investment-profit puzzle” also imply that the virtual and the real econ-
omy may move in opposite directions over a considerable period of time (figures 7a, 8). As 
indicated by figures 4 and 5, the ratio of household wealth to disposable income significantly 
increased during the 1980s, when accumulation was particularly weak and output growth 
lower than in the 1960s, when household wealth developed only sluggishly. 
Finally, in our normal and intermediate cases, shareholder value orientation has a benefi-25 
cial effect on the rate of return on equity and on rentier income only in the short to medium 
run, but a negative one in the longer run. This seems to confirm empirical findings according 
to which firms willingly sacrifice “economic value” in favour of positive short-term financial 
results, due to the fear of a “severe (stock) market reaction to missing an earnings target” 
(Graham et al., 2004, p. 1). 
 
6.  Final Remarks 
 
In this paper, a number of existing contributions on the micro- and macroeconomic effects of 
shareholder value orientation have been reviewed and taken as building blocks for our own 
stock-flow consistent model of financialisation. Our simulation results appear consistent with 
many stylised facts particularly of the US economy since the early 1980s.  
While encompassing some important results from partial analyses in the existing litera-
ture, our model also allows putting into perspective the conclusions derived from earlier work 
on financialisation within stock-flow consistent frameworks. In particular, in the path break-
ing contribution by Lavoie and Godley (2001-2) and in the survey article by Skott and Ryoo 
(2007), shareholder value orientation, as defined in the present paper, tends to have uniquely 
positive effects on the overall economy. In our model, these effects can be either positive or 
negative, which appears more in line with empirical facts.  
Important limitations of our model are the absence of a government and a foreign sector. 
Also, technological progress, inflation and the possibility of changes in relative prices are not 
explicitly considered and our analysis of employment is very rudimentary. A more sophisti-
cated treatment of these issues is required to fully understand the macroeconomic effects of 
financialisation. 26 
Appendix: Parameter Values Used for the Simulations 
 
Equations for Firms 





















Equations for Households 
a1 a2 b1 λ0 λ1 λ2 λ3 rep 
0.6 0.50 0.03 0.85 0.20  0.013  0.0001 0.03 
 




Note: With the chosen values, we obtained realistic steady state solutions for the endogenous variables. The 





Aglietta, M. 2000. "Shareholder value and corporate governance: some tricky questions." 
Economy and Society, 29:1, pp. 146-59. 
Bhaduri, A., K. Laski, and M.  Riese. 2006. "A model of interaction between the virtual and 
the real economy." Metroeconomica, 57, pp. 412-27. 
Bhaduri, A. and S. Marglin. 1990. "Unemployment and the Real Wage - the Economic-Basis 
for Contesting Political Ideologies." Cambridge Journal of Economics, 14:4, pp. 375-93. 
Boyer, R. 2000. "Is a finance-led growth regime a viable alternative to Fordism? A prelimi-
nary analysis." Economy and Society, 29:1, pp. 111-45. 
Brainard, W.  and J.  Tobin. 1990. "On Crotty’s critique of q-theory." Journal of Post Keynes-
ian. Economics, 12, pp. 543–9. 
Chancellor, E. 2005. Crunch Time for Credit? An inquiry into the state of the credit system in 
the United States and Great Britain. Petersfield: Harriman House. 
Cheng, Mei, Subramanyam, K.R. and Y. Zhang. 2005. "Earnings Guidance and Managerial 
Myopia." Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=851545 
Corbett, J.  and T. Jenkinson. 1997. "How is investment financed?  A study of Germany, Ja-
pan, the United Kingdom and the United States." Manchester School, 65:69-93. 
Cordonnier, Laurent. 2006. "Le profit sans l'accumulation: la recette du capitalisme dominé 
par la finance." Innovations, Cahiers d’économie de l’innovation, 23:1  
Crotty, James. 1990. "Owner-manager conflict and financial theories of investment instability 
- A critical assessment of Keynes, Tobin, and Minsky." Journal of Post Keynesian Eco-
nomics, 12:4, pp. 519-42. 
Dos Santos, C. and G. Zezza. 2006. "Distribution and Growth in a Post-Keynesian Stock-
Flow Consistent Model," in Economic growth and distribution: on the nature and causes 
of the wealth of nations. N. Salvadori ed: Edward Elgar. 
Duménil, G. and D. Lévy. 2001. "Costs and benefits of neoliberalism. A class analysis." Re-
view of International Political Economy, 8:4, pp. 578-607. 
Dutt, A.K. 2006. "Maturity, stagnation and consumer debt: a Steindlian approach." 
Metroeconomica, 57, pp. 339-64. 
Eichner, A. 1976. Megacorp and Oligopoly: Micro Foundations of Macro Dynamics. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Fama, E. F. 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm." Journal of Political Econ-
omy, 88:2, pp. 288-307. 27 
Frank, M.  and V. Goyal. 2005. "Trade-off and pecking order theories of debt " in Handbook 
of Corporate Finance: Empirical Corporate Finance E. Eckbo ed. North-Holland: El-
sevier. 
Galbraith, John Kenneth. 1969. The New Industrial State. Harmonsworth, Middlesex: Pelican 
Books. 
Godley, W. and M.  Lavoie. 2007. An Integrated Approach to Credit, Money, Income, Pro-
duction and Wealth. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Graham, John R., Harvey, Campbell R. and S. Rajgopal. 2005. "The Economic Implications 
of Corporate Financial Reporting." NBER Working Paper, 10550 
Harris, M. and A. Raviv. 1991. "The Theory of Capital Structure." Journal of Finance, 46:1, 
pp. 297-355. 
Hein, E. 2006. "Interest, Debt and Capital Accumulation - A Kaleckian Approach." Interna-
tional Review of Applied Economics, 20:3, pp. 337-52. 
Hein, E. 2007. "Interest rate, debt, distribution and capital accumulation in a post-Kaleckian 
model." Metroeconomica, 58:2, pp. 310-39. 
Hein, E. and T. van Treeck. 2007. "‘Financialisation’ in Kaleckian/Post-Kaleckian models of 
distribution and growth." mimeo, IMK in the Hans Boeckler Foundation. 
Jensen, M. C. and W. H. Meckling. 1976. "Theory of Firm - Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure." Journal of Financial Economics, 3:4, pp. 305-60. 
Kaldor N. 1957. "A model of Economic Growth." Economic Journal, 67, 591-624. 
Kaldor, N. 1966. "Marginal productivity and the macro-economic theories of distribution " 
Review of Economic Studies 33:October pp. 309-19. 
Kalecki, M. 1937. "The principle of increasing risk." Economica, 4, pp. 440–47. 
Lavoie, M. 1992. Foundations of Post-Keynesian Economic Analysis. Aldershot: Edward El-
gar. 
Lavoie, M. 1995. "Interest Rates in Post-Keynesian Models of Growth and Distribution." 
Metroeconomica, 46:2, pp. 146-77. 
Lavoie, M. 2006. "Cadrisme with a Kaleckian model of growth and distribution." ROBINSON 
Working Paper, University of Ottawa, 06-05. 
Lavoie, M. and W. Godley. 2001-2. "Kaleckian models of growth in a coherent stock-flow 
monetary framework: a Kaldorian view." Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, 24:2, pp. 
277-311. 
Lazonick, W. and M. O'Sullivan. 2000. "Maximizing shareholder value: a new ideology for 
corporate governance." Economy and Society, 29:1, pp. 13-35. 
Maki, Dean M. and Michael G. Palumbo. 2001. "Disentangling the Wealth Effect: A Cohort 
Analysis of Household Saving in the 1990s." Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System (U.S.). Finance and Economics Discussion Series, 2001-21. 
Mayer, C. 1988. "New issues in corporate finance." European Economic Review, 32, pp. 
1167-89. 
Mayer, C. and O. Sussman. 2002. "Projects are Largely External and Mostly Debt Financed: 
A New Approach to Testing Capital Structure." mimeo, University of Oxford. 
Ndikumana, L. 1999. "Debt Service, Financing Constraints, and Fixed Investment: Evidence 
from Panel Data." Journal of Post Keynesian Economics 21:3, pp. 455-78. 
Palley, T. 2006. "Class conflict and the Cambridge theory of income distribution," in Wages, 
Employment, Distribution and Growth. International Perspectives. E. Hein, Heise, A., 
Truger, A. ed. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Penrose, E. T. 1959. The Theory of the Growth of the Firm. New York: John Wiley. 
Piketty, T and E. Saez. 2003. "Income Inequality In The United States, 1913-1998." Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 118:1, pp. 1-39. 
Porter, M. E. 1992. Capital Choices: The Causes and Cures of Business Myopia. Research 
Report to the U.S. Government’s Council on Competitiveness, Washington D.C. 
Rajan, R.  and L. Zingales. 1995. "What do we know about capital structure? Some evidence 28 
from international data." Journal of Finance, 50, pp. 1421-60. 
Rajan, R. G. 2006. "Investment Restraint, The Liquidity Glut, and Global Imbalances." Re-
marks at the Conference on Global Imbalances organized by the Bank of Indonesia in 
Bali, November 16th. 
Robinson, J. 1962. Essays in the Theory of Economic Growth London: Macmillan. 
Skott, P and S Ryoo. 2007. Macroeconomic Implications of Financialization. Amherst: 
mimeo. 
Steindl, J. 1976. Maturity and Stagnation in American Capitalism, 2nd edn. New York: 
Monthly Review Press. 
Stiglitz, J. and A.  Weiss. 1981. "Credit rationing in  markets with imperfect information." 
American Economic Review, 71, pp. 393-410. 
Stockhammer, E. 2004. "Financialisation and the slowdown of accumulation." Cambridge 
Journal of Economics, 28, pp. 719-41. 
Stockhammer, E. 2005-6. "Shareholder value orientation and the investment–profit puzzle " 
Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, 28:2, pp. 193-215. 
Van de Velde, Franck. 2005. Monnaie, chômage et capitalisme. Villeneuve d'Ascq: Septen-
trion. 
van Treeck, T. 2007. "Reconsidering the investment-profit nexus in finance-led economies: an 
ARDL-based approach." Working Paper, IMK in the Hans Boeckler Foundation, 1/2007.  
Publisher: Hans-Böckler-Stiftung, Hans-Böckler-Str. 39, 40476 Düsseldorf, Germany 
Phone: +49-211-7778-331, IMK@boeckler.de, http://www.imk-boeckler.de  
 





The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect those of the IMK or the Hans-Böckler-Foundation. 
 
All rights reserved. Reproduction for educational and non-commercial purposes is permitted provided that  
the source is acknowledged. 